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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
STEPHEN LAINE WELLS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950773-CA 
Priority No. 2 
In an effort to justify a specifically tailored warrantless 
search of areas in Defendant/Appellant Stephen Wells' ("Wells") 
home, the state has advanced two theories: First, the state asserts 
the warrantless search was proper under the federal and state 
constitutions as "incident to [Wells'] arrest"; second, the state 
asserts Wells failed to properly marshal evidence and preserve 
issues relevant to the "alternative exigent circumstances 
justification" for the search. Neither theory is capable of 
legitimating the activities of the officers in this instance. 
Although the state called witnesses to testify in two separate 
hearings in the trial court, the state cannot, and has not, identi-
fied a single fact to support the determination that the areas 
searched were within Wells' "immediate control" or that the search 
was closely related in time to the arrest (s). In addition, the 
state fails to prove that exigent circumstances existed to justify 
the warrantless search. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE MARSHALED FACTS AND INFERENCES DO NOT 
SUPPORT JUSTIFYING THE SEARCH AS "INCIDENT TO ARREST." 
1 
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that a person's home may not be 
subjected to a warrantless search merely because he happens to be 
arrested there. It is, however, reasonable for an arresting 
officer to search the area into which an arrestee might reach in 
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items, i.e. the area within 
the arrestee's "immediate control." Id. at 763. The warrantless 
search of areas in a home incident to arrest is justified if the 
state can show that certain temporal and geographical factors and 
exigent circumstances existed at the time of the arrest. Id. at 
764; see also, Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819-20 (1969) 
(disavowing residential search as "incident to arrest" where it was 
not confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest) ; Vale v. 
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970); State v. Hycrh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 
n. 2 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (limiting warrantless 
search to "an area within which a suspect could reasonably be 
expected to grab a weapon or destroy evidence"); State v. Ricks, 
816 P.2d 125, 128 (Alaska 1991) (a search remote in time or place 
from arrest cannot be justified); (Appellee's Brief at 8). 
In connection with the state's claim that the officers' search 
of Wells' home was "incident to arrest," the state ignores the 
exigency factor and disregards the lack of evidence concerning 
"immediate control" and temporal proximity. After two evidentiary 
hearings in the trial court on the matter, the state's witnesses 
presented testimony reflecting the following: 
Wells and his house-mate, Kelly Jensen ("Jensen"), 
resided in the basement apartment of a split level home. 
2 
(R. 54, 56, 62, 66-67; cited in Appellee's Brief at 9.) 
Four officers crashed through glass doors of the upper-
level dwelling, went down to the basement apartment, and 
arrested and handcuffed Wells immediately at the bottom 
of the stairs. (R. 65.) At the time officers handcuffed 
and arrested Wells, Jensen was in a closet in a "back 
room" of the basement apartment. (R. 65.) 
Officers were assured immediately after Wells and Jensen 
were handcuffed, or contemporaneous therewith (see notes 
5 and 9, infra), that "there wasn't anybody else in that 
entire house." "The house was empty." (R. 66, 164). 
After officers found Jensen in the closet and arrested 
her, they moved her to another room and interrogated her. 
(R. 148-51 (Officer Gary Sterner ("Sterner") testified 
that he guarded Jensen and had discussions with her, and 
asked her "where the cocaine was").) In response to the 
questions, Jensen told officers about cocaine in the slit 
of a jacket lining and marijuana in a vacuum cleaner.1 
1
 The state asserts that " [b]ecause the marijuana charge, which was 
based on the marijuana recovered from the vacuum cleaner and bed [sic] , 
was dismissed pursuant to the parties [sic] plea agreement . . ., the 
State narrows its response solely to the justification for the seizure 
of cocaine from defendant's jacket which is the basis for the conviction 
on appeal." (Appellee's Brief at 6 n.l.) However, in this matter, the 
conditional plea agreement was made pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P. 2d 
935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Rule ll(i), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Rule 11 (i) states: 
With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, 
a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and 
mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the 
right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse 
determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant 
who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
The trial court approved and the prosecution consented to appellate 
review of the issues specifically raised in the pre-trial Motion to 
Suppress (R. 100-06), including review of the legality of the warrantless 
search of the vacuum cleaner. Pursuant to Rule 11 (i) , Serv, and the plea 
agreement (R. 100), in the event Wells prevails on appeal, he may 
withdraw the plea. If he does so, the original charges (including the 
marijuana charge) will again be pending. Thus, Wells will be in the same 
position he was before the plea was entered, except that he and the state 
will have final appellate resolution on the pre-trial Motion to Suppress. 
A failure to reach the issue of whether the trial court erroneously 
denied the Motion to Suppress as it related to the warrantless search of 
the vacuum would deprive Wells of the benefit of a determination of that 
issue on appeal, as promised and guaranteed by the conditional plea 
bargain. In addition, it would constitute a breach of the plea 
agreement, providing Wells with grounds to withdraw the conditional plea, 
3 
(R. 50.) Jensen's statements to officers took place 
"while Wells was present." (R. 51, 56; cited in 
Appellee's Brief at 9.) 
The officers conducted a second search that was narrower 
in scope than the prior sweep search. The officers 
focused on the areas identified by Jensen: the jacket 
lining and vacuum cleaner. (R. 52-53.) 
Prior to the search of the jacket lining and vacuum 
cleaner, Jensen was in handcuffs and in officer custody 
in a bedroom (R. 14 8) , the vacuum cleaner was located in 
a living room area (R. 150-51) , and the jacket was 
located "on a bed" in a separate room in the basement-
level apartment. (R. 66.) Jensen "took [Officer Russo] 
into the room" where the jacket was located. (R. 53.)2 
Russo testified that when he searched the vacuum cleaner 
and assisted Sterner in searching the jacket lining, he 
was not sure where Wells was, but that he was in the 
basement, which had adjoining rooms. (See R. 53, 67.) 
During the specifically tailored search, Wells was 
already arrested, handcuffed and in custody. (R. 65.) 
According to the facts and inferences, the officers did not conduct 
the specifically tailored search contemporaneous with or in the 
and would render this entire appellate process useless. 
Because the plea agreement concerns appeal of the issues 
specifically identified in the pre-trial Motion to Suppress, Wells has 
addressed the search of the vacuum cleaner. Since the state has failed 
to rebut the presumption that the search was unconstitutional, the trial 
court's ruling on that issue should be summarily reversed and an order 
entered granting the pre-trial Motion as it relates to the vacuum 
cleaner. 
2
 As set forth in Wells' initial brief, although Jensen told 
officers where the contraband drugs could be found and "took" them to the 
drug locations, there is no evidence that she or Wells consented to a 
search of those areas. Evidence of consent must include clear and 
positive testimony that consent was unequivocal, specific, and freely and 
intelligently given, without duress or coercion, express or implied. 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), aff 'd. 853 P.2d 898 
(Utah 1993); U.S. v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1973) (action in 
pointing to area where drug package was kept did not constitute consent) . 
The record in this case contains no evidence whatsoever that officers 
requested or obtained consent to conduct the search. Rather, the record 
reflects that Jensen disclosed the location of the cocaine in response 
to the officers' questions. See State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 
1983), where admitting to growing marijuana does not mean defendant has 
consented to a search for it. 
4 
vicinity of Wells' and Jensen's arrests. In fact, the officers did 
not conduct a "search" per se; they simply went to the jacket and 
vacuum cleaner to seize drugs. The trial court summed up the 
evidence and challenge to the search as follows: 
What's being challenged is once the defendant was in 
custody, that is, handcuffed and in custody, what was it 
that then would allow or authorize the officers to go the 
step further of going into another location in the home 
to seize the drugs in question? 
(R. 143.) The state's case lacks evidence concerning "immediate 
control," and the proximity in time between the arrest and search. 
Thus the "incident to arrest" exception is an improper basis for 
affirming the judgment in this matter.3 
A. THE STATE'S LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT WELLS 
WAS IN "IMMEDIATE CONTROL" OF THE JACKET AND VACUUM 
CLEANER REFUTES THE DETERMINATION THAT THE SEARCH WAS 
INCIDENT TO ARREST. 
The state bears the burden of proving that the presumptively 
unreasonable search of the jacket and vacuum cleaner was valid 
under both the federal and state constitutions.4 Thus, the state 
3
 The state incorrectly asserts that the trial court justified the 
"limited and contemporaneous" search of the vacuum cleaner and jacket as 
"incident to defendant's warrant-supported arrest on drug related 
charges." (Appellee's Brief at 6.) The phrase "incident to arrest" is 
found in the record in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Denying Motion to Suppress Evidence, which were prepared by the state 
("Findings and Conclusions"). The Findings and Conclusions state (i) 
officers interrogated Jensen "incident to arrest" (R. 112) and (ii) under 
certain "exigent circumstances" warrant and warrantless arrests and 
searches "incident to arrest" are justified. (R. 113.) Although the 
trial court ultimately and erroneously determined "exigent circumstances" 
existed in this case, it did not validate the search of the jacket and 
vacuum cleaner as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest. 
4
 See Katz v. Unites States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Pavton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (warrantless searches and seizures 
inside the home are presumptively unreasonable); State v. Gardiner, 814 
P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991) (recognizing warrantless searches are per se 
5 
was required to present to the trial court evidence concerning the 
area of "immediate control" to justify the search of those areas as 
incident to Wells' arrest. Where the state fails to present clear 
evidence to rebut the presumption, the warrantless search cannot be 
justified. See State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) ("This court cannot properly determine the outcome of a fact 
sensitive issue where the record below is not clear").5 
1. A Search Incident to Arrest Is Restricted to the Room 
Where Officers Arrested the Defendant. 
In the context of the "incident to arrest" exception, the 
Supreme Court in Chime 1, 3 95 U.S. at 763, construed the phrase 
"area within [the arrestee's] immediate control" as follows: 
[T] he area from within which he might gain possession of 
a weapon or destructible evidence. 
There is no comparable justification, however, for 
routinely searching any room other than that in which an 
arrest occurs -- or, for that matter, for searching 
through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed 
unreasonable under Art. I, sec. 14 of the Utah Constitution);State v. 
Harrison, 805 P. 2d 769, 784 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (burden is on the state 
to justify the search); State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1290-91 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
5
 In the trial court the prosecutor apparently recognized that the 
evidence was not sufficiently clear to rebut the presumption (R. 88-89), 
and identified "additional particulars" allegedly relevant to the search 
in an effort to provide clarity. Although the prosecutor's "additional 
particulars" do not constitute evidence and in part are not supported by 
the record, they reflect that the state has believed, until now, that 
certain circumstances existed placing the search of the vacuum cleaner 
and jacket beyond the pale demarcated by Chime1 and its progeny. 
Specifically, the prosecutor acknowledged that upon entering the premises 
the officers arrested Wells in a hallway and contemporaneous therewith 
conducted the sweep search; then officers arrested Jensen in the "baby's 
bedroom," secured her and moved her to "the larger masterbedroom." (R. 
89.) Contrary to the state's assertions on appeal, the search of the 
vacuum cleaner and jacket occurred after the sweep search and in rooms 
other than where Jensen and Wells were arrested. The state appears to 
have raised the "incident to arrest" exception on appeal as part of a 
last-minute shift in tactics. 
6 
areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence 
of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the 
authority of a search warrant. 
Id. In this matter officers searched through closed and concealed 
areas: the lining of the jacket and the vacuum cleaner. No "well-
recognized" exceptions authorize such a search. 
In addition, the officers searched areas in rooms "other than 
[those] in which the arrest[s] occurred." (R. 65 (officers arrested 
Wells at the bottom of the stairs near basement apartment entry), 
R. 14 8 (officers found Jensen in closet in "back room" and arrested 
her), R. 150-51 (Russo located vacuum cleaner in living room), and 
R. 53 (Jensen "took" officers to jacket on "a bed" in a separate 
room).) The warrantless search for evidence was not justified by 
any recognized exception and was therefore contrary to the Fourth 
Amendment. See State v. Austin, 584 P. 2d 853, 856 (Utah 1978) 
(search restricted to single room where defendant arrested); State 
v. Farnsworth, 519 P.2d 244, 246 (Utah 1974) ("It is not to be 
doubted that when an accused is under arrest and in custody, a 
search made elsewhere would not ordinarily be justified as incident 
to the arrest"); State v. Cox, 200 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Minn. 1972) 
(search limited to bedroom were defendant arrested) (cited with 
approval in Austin, 584 P.2d at 856); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 
N.Y.2d 499, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 799, 300 N.E.2d 139, cert, denied, 
414 U.S. 1033 (1973) (cited with approval in Austin, 584 P.2d at 
856) . The officers7 seizure of drugs from closed and concealed 
areas in rooms other than where the arrests of Jensen and Wells 
occurred renders the search and seizure unconstitutional. See 
7 
State v. Johnston, 645 P. 2d 63 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (after 
defendant's arrest in office, officers' warrantless search of purse 
found in closet was unconstitutional). 
2. Police Cannot Circumvent the Fourth Amendment by 
Escorting the Arrestee to Other Rooms in the House in 
Order to Conduct a Search Incident to Arrest. 
The state makes the ambiguous and meaningless assertion that 
Wells was "within several feet" of the jacket; therefore, the 
jacket was "within an area" of "immediate control." (Appellee's 
Brief at 9.) Since Wells and Jensen were not arrested in the rooms 
where the searched items were located, the distance of "several 
feet" must be as the crow flies, failing to take into consideration 
the walls and rooms between Wells, Jensen, and the items. 
If the state is suggesting Wells was in the rooms where the 
items and/or Jensen were located, the necessary inference is that 
officers escorted Wells to those areas in order to search the 
specifically identified items as incident to Wells' arrest. Such 
a warrantless search is unconstitutional. 
In U.S. v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1973), the 
defendant was arrested as he was about to board an airplane and was 
taken to a room at the airport, after which his checked luggage was 
retrieved from the plane and brought to the office where he was in 
custody. Officers searched the luggage in defendant's presence and 
confiscated evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit ruled the search was not incident to the arrest: "The 
police cannot circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement 
by arresting a person and then bringing that person into contact 
8 
with his possessions which are otherwise unrelated to the arrest." 
Id. at 1266; see also Shipley, 395 U.S. at 820 (the constitution 
has never been construed to allow the police, in the absence of an 
emergency, to arrest a person in one location and then take him to 
another location for the purpose of conducting a warrantless 
search); U.S. v. Wright, 577 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978); U.S. v. 
Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Of course, Chimel, 
does not permit the arresting officers to lead the accused from 
place to place and use his presence in each location to justify a 
'search incident to the arrest'"). 
3 . The Fact that Wells Owned the Jacket Does Not Per Se 
Validate the Search as Incident to Arrest. 
The state has cited to a number of cases "uphold [ing] 
contemporaneous searches of an arrestee's clothing" as incident to 
arrest, as though such a search is per se reasonable. (Appellee's 
Brief at 9-10.) However, the cases cited by the state focus on the 
"immediate control" factor and are factually distinguishable from 
this matter. In State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d 487 (N.C. 1985), the 
court upheld the search of the defendant's jacket as incident to 
arrest where the defendant was three or four feet from it and made 
a motion in front of officers toward it. "Additionally, when the 
defendant was taken to the sheriff's department he was allowed to 
wear the jacket." Id. at 489. 
In Commonwealth v. Wheat ley, 402 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 1978), 
officers obtained a warrant to search the defendant's premises 
based on probable cause that his house-mate was dealing in heroin. 
When officers executed the warrant, they found defendant at the 
9 
kitchen entrance, drug paraphernalia on the kitchen table, and 
defendant's jacket in front of him on the back of a kitchen chair. 
It appeared to the officers that the defendant and house-mate had 
been "shooting up." Id. at 1048-49. They arrested defendant on 
drug charges, searched the defendant's jacket and confiscated a 
handgun, which resulted in firearms charges against him. On appeal 
the court upheld the search on the basis that the jacket was 
sufficiently under the control of the house-mate and therefore 
permissible as part of the search conducted pursuant to the 
warrant, and as incident to arrest. 
The court in State v. LeBlanc, 347 A. 2d 590 (Me. 1975), 
recognized that a search incident to arrest must be limited to the 
area where the arrest occurred. The police in that case were 
called to an apartment where "strange goings on" were reported. 
When they arrived, they observed what appeared to be a burglary in 
progress, entered the apartment and asked the defendant for 
identification. He refused to cooperate. Because the officers 
believed they had interrupted a burglary, an officer went directly 
to the defendant's jacket for information concerning his identity 
or status as a burglar. The jacket was in defendant's full view, 
8 to 10 feet away, and within his immediate control. In upholding 
the search the court stated: 
Regardless of this officer's subjective purpose, a 
reasonable and prudent police officer in these 
circumstances would have been justified in searching the 
area within which this still unrestrained defendant might 
obtain a weapon or destroy evidence of the crime of which 
the police had probable cause to believe him guilty. 
Id. at 595. 
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In People v. Lvda, 327 N.E.2d 494 (111.Ct.App. 1975), the 
court upheld the search of the arrestee's jacket, which was hanging 
on a peg across the room. The arrest took place in a public area 
and the jacket, which belonged to defendant, could not be left 
behind. Thus, it was searched before it was returned to defendant. 
The state also cites to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
(1981), as governing a residential search incident to arrest. In 
that case, a single officer engaged in a high speed chase, overtook 
the vehicle and four passengers, pulled the vehicle over, ordered 
its occupants out of the car, observed evidence of marijuana in 
plain view, arrested the four occupants, and searched them and the 
vehicle contemporaneous to the arrest. Id. at 455-56. The 
contemporaneous search yielded cocaine in Belton's jacket, and he 
moved to suppress it as evidence. On appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the search and adopted a bright-line test for 
automobile searches incident to arrest: 
[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the 
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous 
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of 
that automobile. 
Id. at 460. The Court cautioned that its ruling "does no more than 
determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and 
problematic context," thereby signaling the bright-line rule 
applies only in the context of vehicular searches and does not 
apply in the context of searching residential premises. Belton, 
453 U.S. at 460; see also State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied. Case No. 960094 (Utah April 23, 
1996) (citing Belton as putting an end to confusion under Fourth 
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Amendment surrounding search of automobiles incident to arrest). 
The facts and inferences in this case lack the indicia of 
"immediate control" identified in the cases cited by the state. 
Among other things, officers did not observe the jacket or vacuum 
cleaner in the rooms where the arrests occurred, they did not 
observe Wells motioning or lunging toward the objects, and they did 
not search the objects for objective purposes to check identifica-
tion or so that Wells could take the items with him to the police 
station.6 "Rather, the search had been made in order to find 
narcotics, which were in fact found." Chime1, 3 95 U.S. at 763. 
4. The Area of "Immediate Control" Was Severely 
Restricted Where Wells and Jensen Were in Handcuffs and 
in the Custody of Four Officers. 
The state claims that the fact that Wells was in custody, 
arrested and handcuffed during the search of the vacuum cleaner and 
jacket is irrelevant. (Appellee's Brief at 10.) Yet those factors 
are important in assessing two circumstances of the search: control 
and exigencies. The precise circumstance of the incident must be 
evaluated in determining the area within those premises which may 
be said to be within the arrestee's immediate control. Austin, 584 
P.2d at 856 (the effect of putting handcuffs on the arrestee is a 
6
 Russo testified that sufficient time lapsed, between the time 
Wells ran downstairs to the time officers arrested him at the bottom of 
the stairs, to permit Wells to hide cocaine in the jacket and marijuana 
in the vacuum. (R. 52.) Such speculation is not sufficient to satisfy 
the "exigent circumstances" factor. See U.S. v. Salgado, 807 F.2d 603, 
609 (7th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988) (the possibility 
without more that evidence will be destroyed if police take the time to 
obtain a warrant is insufficient to justify conduct). Even if Wells hid 
the drugs in that brief time period, it is unclear how Jensen knew to 
tell officers where the drugs were located since she was hiding in a 
closet. Further, the drugs were not in danger of being destroyed. 
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factor in determining the necessity for the search); U.S. v. Lyons, 
706 F.2d 321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (the court must ask whether the 
area in question, was "conceivably accessible to the arrestee --
assuming that he was neither 'an acrobat [nor] a Houdini'?"); 3 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.3(c), 303-06 (3d ed. 1996). 
The fact that an arrestee was in handcuffs supports the 
determination that the search of the nearby area was not within his 
immediate control. See U.S. v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 570 (8th 
Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 499 U.S. 938 (1991) (search was illegal 
under incident to arrest doctrine where handcuffed suspect was 
unable to access briefcase); U.S. v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954, 956 
(10th Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103, 105 (10th Cir. 1969), 
cert, denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971); U.S. v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056, 
1062 (5th Cir. 1980). 
In addition, because Wells and Jensen were taken into custody 
by four officers, the area of possible reach and control was 
considerably limited. It was unlikely Wells and Jensen could get 
by four officers in order to gain access to and control over the 
jacket and vacuum cleaner in other rooms. See State v. Ricks, 816 
P. 2d 125 (Alaska 1991) (defendant would have to get by two officers 
to get to his jacket placing it out of his "immediate control"); 
People v. Bishop, 377 N.E.2d 585, 588 (111. Ct. App. 1987); State 
v. Cook, 332 S.E.2d 147, 154-55 (W.Va. 1985) (search of top of 
dresser improper after 2 of 3 arrestees handcuffed and all 3 seated 
on bed with shotguns pointed at them) ; U.S. v. Hill, 73 0 F.2d 1163, 
1167-68 (8th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984) (three 
officers in immediate area surrounding defendant restricted area of 
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"immediate control"); U.S. v. Mapp. 476 F.2d 67, 79-80 (2d Cir. 
1973) . The state has failed to satisfy the "immediate control" 
factor in this case. 
With respect to the exigency factor, officers in this matter 
never articulated concerns for safety or the preservation of 
evidence (Appellee's Brief at 15 ("no deputy expressly testified 
that he was concerned for his safety")). To the extent the facts 
imply such concerns existed at the time of the arrests, officers 
put them to rest with a sweep search that left them empty-handed 
and assured them "the house was empty." (R. 66.) The officers' 
search should have ended there, as set forth in Maryland v. Buie, 
494 U.S. 325 (1990): 
[A]s an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a 
precautionary matter and without probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces 
immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an 
attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, how-
ever, we hold that there must be articulable facts which, 
taken together with the rational inferences from those 
facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in be-
lieving that the area to be swept harbors an individual 
posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. This is no 
more and no less than was required in Terry and Long, and 
as in those cases, we think this balance is the proper 
one. 
We should emphasize that such a protective sweep, aimed 
at protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the 
circumstances, is nevertheless not a full search of the 
premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of 
those spaces where a person may be found. The sweep 
lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the reason-
able suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than 
it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises. 
Id. at 335-36. In this matter, sometime after the arrests officers 
went directly to the vacuum cleaner and jacket to confiscate 
evidence, plain and simple. Since officers had already assured 
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themselves during the sweep search that the house was empty, an 
additional search of other areas of the house was unjustified. To 
permit otherwise would render the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment as articulated in Chime1 and Buie a nullity. 
B. THE STATE HAS NO EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PROXIMITY IN 
TIME BETWEEN THE SEARCH AND THE ARREST. 
The state presented no evidence in the trial court to support 
a determination that the search was closely related in time to 
Wells7 and/or Jensen's arrests. This Court has held in Fourth 
Amendment cases concerning warrantless searches incident to arrest 
that the search must be a contemporaneous incident of the arrest to 
be valid. State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1245; State v. Harrison, 
805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991) (contemporaneous to arrest, a diaper 
bag was searched). The record in this case reflects only that the 
search was made. Where the state fails to present evidence to 
rebut the presumption that the warrantless search was unreasonable, 
it cannot be justified. See Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253. 
C. THE STATE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES ADDED PROTECTION FROM 
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY POLICE. 
Art. I, sec. 14 of the Utah Constitution is identical in part 
to the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, but is given 
more force. See State v. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460, 465-68 (Utah 
1990); accord. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-17 (Utah 1991) .7 As a result 
7
 The majority of the Utah Supreme Court has supported at various 
times analyzing Art. I, sec. 14 in a manner separate from the Fourth 
Amendment in order to provide the citizens of Utah with greater, 
15 
of "some of the confusing exceptions to the warrant requirement 
that have been developed by federal law in recent years," Larocco, 
794 P. 2d at 4 69, the Utah Supreme Court has adhered to the "concept 
of expectation of privacy as a suitable threshold criterion for 
determining whether article I, section 14 is applicable. Then if 
article I, section 14 applies, warrantless searches will be 
permitted only where they satisfy their traditional justification, 
namely, to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent 
the destruction of evidence.11 Id. at 469-70. 
Although Larocco concerns the warrantless search of an 
automobile, the same if not greater "threshold criterion" and 
"traditional justifications" must apply before a warrantless search 
predictable protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See 
Justice Durham's plurality opinion in Larocco, 794 P. 2d at 461, 473, 
joined by Chief Justice Zimmerman; Chief Justice Zimmerman's concurring 
opinion in State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1239 (Utah 1996) ("I must 
point out that the lead opinion's directive to Utah courts to construe 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution in a manner similar to 
constructions of the Fourth Amendment except in compelling circumstances 
is not supported by a majority of this court and is not Utah law . . . 
[I] fault the lead opinion for blindly adhering to federal precedent on 
this [search and seizure] issue"); and Justice Howe's lead opinion in 
Thompson, 810 P. 2d at 416 (interpreting Article I, section 14 to provide 
greater protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than 
federal counterpart). Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurred in the 
result in Larocco, but provided no insight into his rationale. See State 
v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah 1994). Notwithstanding, Associate 
Chief Justice Stewart embraces the court's responsibility to 
independently interpret Utah constitutional provisions: 
If this Court were to view its constitutional duty to construe the 
provisions in the Utah Declaration of Rights in the exact same 
manner as the United States Supreme Court construes analogous 
provisions in the Bill of Rights, we would violate the spirit and 
intended effect of Utah constitutional law and policy as established 
by the framers of the Utah Constitution. 
Anderson, 910 P. 2d at 1240. But see id. at 1235 (Justice Russon: 
"Although we are obligated to provide a state law review, such an 
independent analysis is not necessarily a different analysis"). 
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of a home will be upheld. " [T] here is a significant difference 
between an exigent circumstances analysis involving an automobile 
and one involving a private residence. In their own homes, citizens 
enjoy a 'heightened expectation of privacy.'" State v. South, 885 
P.2d 795, 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
To that end, and as a preface to Larocco, Chief Justice 
Zimmerman suggested the following in considering warrantless 
searches of premises: 
One way to improve [the contradictory and confusing 
rationalizations and distinctions under federal law] 
might be to sharply limit the sweep of exceptions to the 
warrant requirement that often raise questions of police 
overreaching. In their place, clear-cut rules could be 
adopted -- for example, a flat requirement that a warrant 
must be obtained before any non-consensual search of 
property not in the immediate physical control of a 
suspect is conducted. Such a rule would be an 
improvement over present law, both for the individual and 
for the police. The individual would be assured that, in 
most cases, his property would not be searched or seized 
unless the reasons for the search or seizure have first 
been presented to a neutral magistrate and a warrant 
issued. At the same time, police officers would not be 
forced to speculate about what may or may not be subject 
to search without a warrant. Warrantless searches would 
be permitted only where they satisfy their traditional 
justification --to protect the safety of officers or to 
prevent the destruction of evidence. Once the threat 
that the suspect will injure the officers with concealed 
weapons or will destroy evidence is gone, there is no 
persuasive reason why the officers cannot take the time 
to secure a warrant. Such a requirement would present 
little impediment to police investigations, especially in 
light of the ease with which warrants can be obtained 
under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 
77-23-4(2). 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring) (footnotes and cites omitted). 
Art. I, sec. 14 is the principal protection under the Utah 
Constitution against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings. 
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At a minimum, the state must be required to show that probable 
cause and articulable exigent circumstances existed at the time of 
the search to justify the conduct.8 See State v. Northrup, 756 
P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . " [T] he need for an immediate 
search must be apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh 
the important protection of individual rights provided by the 
warrant requirement." State v. South, 885 P. 2d 795, 799 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (quoting State v. Beavers, 859 P. 2d 9, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) . 
Other states have rejected federal cases developing the 
"incident to arrest" exception under the Fourth Amendment, and have 
ruled that under state constitutional provisions, officers must be 
able to point to specific and articulable facts that an exigency 
existed to support a warrantless search. See also. State v. 
Barrett, 701 P.2d 1277, 1281 (Haw. 1985); People v. Qokev, 457 
N.E.2d 723, 724-25 (N.Y. 1983) (marijuana recovered from arrestee's 
bag was suppressed in the absence of exigent circumstances to 
justify search). 
The evidence before this Court refutes, among other things, 
the existence of an articulable exigency at the time of the search 
8
 The warrantless search exception articulated under Art. I, sec. 
14 is different from the federal "incident to arrest" exception in at 
least one basic respect: the federal exception takes into consideration 
the probable cause and exigent circumstances existing at the time of the 
arrest. Notwithstanding the difference, the exception under Art. I, sec. 
14 satisfies police concerns for safety and the preservation of evidence, 
while simplifying the confusion developed under the federal "incident to 
arrest" analysis, where courts justify a search even when handcuffs are 
firmly fastened on the defendant, who has been removed from the 
automobile or to some distant part of the room or house, and there is no 
likelihood that the defendant will reach the area in question. 
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as mandated by Larocco. (See Appellant's Brief, dated 2/28/96, at 
18-24.) Thus, even if the search may be justified under the 
federal constitution as reasonable, there is no persuasive reason 
why, under Art. I, sec. 14, the officers could not have taken the 
time to secure a warrant. 
POINT 11 . THE STATE FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE "EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES" TO JUSTIFY THE SEARCH UNDER THE SEPARATE 
"PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES" EXCEPTION. 
The state next claims that Wells' challenge to the search 
under the "exigent circumstances" exception fails for three 
reasons: (1) Wells allegedly failed to marshal Russo's testimony 
and the trial court's express finding "that the deputies were not 
able to determine that no individuals other than [Wells] and 
[Jensen] remained in the apartment until sometime after the 
arrests" (Appellee's Brief at 13-14); (2) exigencies existed to 
justify the forced entry and arrest (id. at 14) ; and (3) "deputies 
were reasonably concerned for the possible destruction of suspected 
narcotics" (id. at 15). 
With respect to the first point, the trial court's "express 
finding" is not supported by Russo's testimony, which reflects that 
a sweep search was conducted immediately after Wells was arrested 
and cuffed.9 The state completely disregards that evidence. Even 
9
 According to Russo, the sweep search was conducted immediately 
after the officers arrested Wells: 
ATD [Counsel for Wells] : Who was in the room when [Wells] was 
arrested? Cuffed? 
A [Russo]: Those three additional officers. 
ATD: Okay. And was [Jensen] already cuffed by then? 
A: [Wells] was cuffed first and [Jensen] was in the back 
room. So probably no. 
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if officers waited to make the sweep search until sometime after 
the arrests, as suggested by the state, they could not use that 
search to confiscate drugs from the jacket and vacuum cleaner. The 
protective sweep would be aimed only at protecting the arresting 
officers, Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-36; it is unreasonable to infer 
that officers believed the jacket and vacuum cleaner were "spaces 
where a person may be found." Id. 
With regard to the second point, the circumstances leading up 
to the arrest are irrelevant since the probable cause and exigent 
circumstances exception takes into account the circumstances at the 
ATD: So as far as you know he was in handcuffs as soon as you 
could get him in handcuffs . . .? 
A: Yes. 
ATD: . . . upon making entry? 
A: Yes. 
ATD: There wasn't any stopping to chit chat, or look for 
anything, or look around. 
A: No. We had to gas the dog because the dog bit Sterner. 
ATD: And other than that -- was he in handcuffs at the time 
the dog bit? 
A: No, we were trying to get to him. 
ATD: Okay. So immediately after the dog bite, that's when he 
gets cuffed? 
A: Yes. 
ATD: Okay. And there wasn't anybody else in that entire 
house, correct? 
A: Yes. 
ATD: At that time? 
A: Correct. 
ATD: The house was empty. 
A: Correct. 
(R. 65-66.) In addition, the trial court examined Russo on that point: 
THE COURT: Deputy Russo, there was an indication when you 
made entrance into the home that it was subsequently 
determined that the home contained only two occupants, those 
who were arrested? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: When was the determination that those were the 
only two occupants of the home made, before or after the 
defendant was placed in handcuffs? 
THE WITNESS: After. 
(R. 164.) 
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time of the search. See State v. South, 885 P.2d 795, 798-99 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (considering probable cause factor in conjunction 
with search); State v. Clark, 654 P.2d 355, 360 (Haw. 1982) 
(considerations relate to search). 
In order to justify a warrantless search under that exception, 
the circumstances must lead officers to conclude that there is no 
time to obtain a search warrant. In this case officers had already 
effected the arrest warrants. Consequently, the events leading up 
to and ending with the execution of those warrants (Wells fleeing 
downstairs while pulling something from his pocket; deputies 
requesting entry and breaking glass door; the attack by the dog and 
subsequent gassing of the dog prior to Wells' arrest) are 
irrelevant. In addition, the officers conducted a sweep search. 
Thus, the execution of the arrest warrant and the subsequent sweep 
search insulate the prior "exigencies" from the second, subsequent, 
warrantless search of discreet areas. See U.S. v. Irizarry, 673 
F.2d 554, 559 (1st Cir. 1982) (after defendants were arrested and 
a security sweep of room had been completed, no further exigency 
justified search of area above drop ceiling in bathroom); Finch v. 
State, 592 P.2d 1196 (Alaska 1979); Kwok T. v. Mauriello, 401 
N.Y.S.2d 52, 56-57, 371 N.E.2d 814 (1977) (after police had 
arrested defendant and had information concerning location of 
evidence, police had no reason to believe evidence would be removed 
or destroyed prior to obtaining a warrant). Once Wells and Jensen 
were arrested there was no persuasive reason why the officers could 
not take the time to secure a warrant. 
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With regard to the third point, as acknowledged by the state, 
nothing in the record supports the determination that exigent 
circumstances existed (Appellee's Brief at 15). In fact, officers 
conducted a sweep search to placate safety concerns. With respect 
to the destruction of evidence, unlike the agents in State v. Ashe, 
745 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Utah 1987), officers in this matter did not 
hear "the sound of a flushing toilet," Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1260, 
leading them to believe "defendant was attempting to destroy 
suspected narcotics." (Appellee's Brief at 15.) Since the "goods 
ultimately seized were not in the process of destruction," the 
search on that basis cannot be justified. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 
U.S. 30, 35 (1970) . The state has failed to identify exigent 
circumstances to rebut the presumption that the warrantless search 
was unreasonable. 
POINT III. WELLS PROPERLY PRESERVED AND HAS PROPERLY 
RAISED IN THIS APPEAL THE ISSUE OF THE OFFICERS' ABILITY 
TO OBTAIN A WARRANT IN DETERMINING THE UNREASONABLENESS 
OF THE SEARCH. 
Finally, the state asserts Wells did not sufficiently raise 
the issue concerning the officers' failure to show they were unable 
to obtain a telephonic search warrant. (Appellee's Brief at 16.) 
The state claims that the issue was "only nominally challenged" in 
a footnote, when in fact trial counsel identified Utah law 
applicable to obtaining telephonic warrants (R. 43 and 45) , and 
argued during the hearing on the pre-trial Motion to Suppress that 
under the circumstances officers "could have easily secured the 
area and done a telephonic search warrant, let a magistrate decide 
22 
if [probable cause existed]." (R. 141.) 
The state has overlooked the issues raised in the record, and 
has overstated the breadth and purpose of the waiver doctrine: 
The requirement of a specific objection on the record 
ensures that the trial court will understand the basis of 
the objections and have an opportunity to correct any 
errors before the case goes to the jury. 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988); Utah County v. 
Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) ("[I]n order to preserve a plea 
of error, the alleged error must have been raised seasonably by 
counsel to the trial court . . . to allow the trial court to 
correct any error, if error there be11); Wurst v. Dep't of 
Employment Sec., 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (issue 
sufficiently raised where mentioned in letter to department which 
served as appeal of A.L.J.'s decision). 
In this case, the preservation concerns have been served. The 
trial court was apprised of the fact that officers failed to seek 
the issuance of a warrant via telephone and of the need to have a 
magistrate decide the issues. The trial court also was apprised of 
Utah law bearing on that issue. The trial court was given the 
opportunity to rule on the matter and ruled that the Motion to 
Suppress was denied. The issues surrounding the state's failure to 
obtain a search warrant via telephone were not raised "for the 
first time in this Court" as asserted by the state. (Appellee's 
Brief at 17.) While the basis for requiring such a warrant was not 
spelled out in the same manner as on appeal, the issues were clear 
and obvious: The telephonic search warrant provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-23-4(2) (1993) renumbered as § 77-23-204(2) (1995) were 
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available to and should have been utilized by the officers in order 
that a magistrate could determine whether a search warrant could be 
issued in accordance with the federal and state constitutions. (R. 
43, 45, 141.) The officers failed to seek issuance of a such 
search warrant. The matter must now be resolved on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Wells respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the Motion to Suppress. 
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